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Abstract 
We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues 
of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a 
bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely 
explained by the co-activation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm 
violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. 
Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. 
Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, while disgust 
responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of 
cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on 
anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the 
manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by 
different cues in a moral situation. 
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Moral Anger, But Not Moral Disgust, Responds to Intentionality 
 
Inscribed in the play [Oedipus at Colonus] is the conflict between, on the one hand, 
primal taboo - which when violated disrupts the cosmos, results in physical pollution, 
and demands violent retribution - and, on the other hand, a more enlightened ethical 
and legal code which takes into account motive and intent (Holmberg, 2004). 
In Aeschylus’ tragedy Oedipus at Colonus, after Oedipus blinds himself and goes into 
exile, the dramatist describes a conflict between moral standards.  According to the ancient 
taboos Oedipus has violated, he is guilty; however, under the more advanced legal code 
current in Athens at the time, he is innocent because he was acting in ignorance and self-
defense – without intent and with justification.  Although this story is ancient, the conflict 
between categorical violation of taboos and mitigating circumstances is still alive today.  We 
argue that it is reflected in the difference between the two other-condemning moral emotions 
of anger and disgust.  
Recently, in the field of law (de Cremer & van den Bos, 2007; Maroney, 2006) and in 
moral judgment more generally (Haidt, 2001), a strong case has been made that emotions and 
not just reasoning are important for moral judgments in general.  The present research 
proposes a more specific hypothesis about different influences on the distinct moral emotions 
of anger and disgust. We believe that anger, unlike disgust, responds to two important kinds 
of contextual cues that determine moral condemnation: whether an act harms other people, 
and whether an act was committed intentionally. On the other hand, disgust independently of 
anger is uniquely responsive to whether or not an act has violated a norm about the use of 
body, such as those against incest or cannibalism.   
A number of current theories give answers of varying scope to the question of what 
kind of things elicit moral disgust versus anger.  Rozin, Haidt and McCauley (1993) argue 
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that as opposed to core disgust, which responds primarily to cues of infection and parasites, 
the primary function of socio-moral disgust is to preserve the social order.  Therefore, 
individuals or groups may elicit socio-moral disgust just for having done something that is 
morally wrong or does not fit in within society. More specifically, Jones and Fitness (2008) 
argue that individuals are specifically disgusted by moral transgressors that use deception and 
abuse their power. Therefore, according to this definition an individual or group can be 
deemed as disgusting if they have engaged in a despicable behavior.  However, neither of 
these definitions specifically distinguishes between situations that elicit anger and disgust, 
and indeed anger is also a plausible response to a norm violation or to deception and abuse.  
Recent research has found some evidence that anger and disgust have distinct 
cognitive elicitors.  For example, in research testing the CAD hypothesis of other-
condemning moral emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), disgust was associated 
with purity violations, which are acts that can be deemed as polluting the body or soul – for 
example, incest or touching a corpse.  Anger, on the other hand, came about principally in 
scenarios where autonomy ethics were violated, by acts that harmed another individual or 
violated their rights.  
More recent research on anger and disgust has used more controlled manipulations of 
parallel scenarios to demonstrate different elicitors of moral anger and disgust. Gutierrez and 
Giner-Sorolla (2007) found that disgust at a scientific experiment responded to a 
manipulation of whether or not it technically violated a taboo against eating human flesh, 
while anger responded primarily to manipulations of whether or not the experiment violated 
the rights of others, although it showed a lesser increase to the fact of taboo violation when 
harm was not described.  In particular, these differences were most apparent when controlling 
for variance shared by reports of anger and disgust.   
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The frequent co-occurrence of anger and disgust in moral situations might account for 
some confusion in the literature about what exactly elicits each kind of response.  Some 
researchers have argued that “disgust” which arises in response to moral offenses is not just 
different from core disgust, but is actually only a metaphorical use of disgust language to 
display the true emotion of anger (Bloom, 2004; Nabi, 2002). However, we believe that once 
the co-occurrence of anger and disgust is controlled for, disgust does have a specific function 
in moral judgment, although not so broad a function as to cover all types of norm violations.  
Rather, we think that the specific function of moral disgust is to police norms dealing with 
the use of the body.  This view, we argue, is supported by previously cited studies 
distinguishing anger and disgust, and by recent neuroscience findings showing differences in 
the brain systems that respond to violations of sexual and nonsexual moral norms (Moll et al., 
2005, Schaich Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008).  
The present research builds on existing research by examining an additional factor 
that might influence moral anger independently of moral disgust.  Moral anger has been 
associated not just with attributions of harm, but also with the concept of blame or 
responsibility (Alicke, 2000; Goldberg, Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock et al., 2007).  This 
can itself be influenced by mitigating considerations within a given situation, such as whether 
actions are intentional (Schlenker, 1997; Weiner, 1995). Past research, however, has not 
specifically examined the relationship between attributions of intentionality, and anger as 
opposed to disgust. We believe that disgust’s insensitivity to intentionality, as well as to 
harm, further distinguishes it from anger.  An action that violates a bodily norm is disgusting 
whether or not it was done intentionally; however, because intent is a component of blame, it 
has the potential to intensify or eliminate angry responses. Therefore, while intent and harm 
should predict anger, only the fact that someone has committed a bodily norm violation 
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should predict disgust. These patterns should be especially clear when controlling for 
covariance between anger and disgust. 
The present experiment looked at moral judgments of a scientist’s actions, three 
elements of which were manipulated in a crossed design: a) whether the scientist violated a 
taboo bodily norm against the eating of human flesh (vs. a more normal kind of meat); b) 
whether the scientist symbolically harmed other people by violating their rights (vs. harmed 
only the self); c) whether the scientist acted intentionally, (vs. unknowingly because of 
someone else’s mistake).  The first two manipulations conceptually replicated Gutierrez & 
Giner-Sorolla (2007), while the third tested our novel hypothesis about intentionality.   
Method 
Participants 
This study consisted of 266 participants. From this number, 25 participants were 
excluded because they reported themselves to be vegetarians, and thus might have moral 
objections even to the conditions in which eating of animal instead of human meat was 
described. The final data set included 241 participants (196 females, 41 males, and 4 who did 
not identify their sex) between the ages of 18 to 43 (M= 19.70, SD=3.81). Individuals were 
recruited from the departmental research scheme at a large university in Britain and received 
course credit for participating.  
Design, Materials, and Procedure 
This study was a 2 x 2 x 2 between–participants design, manipulating Taboo (High 
Taboo vs. Low Taboo) x Harm (Harm to others vs. Harm to self) x Intent (Intent vs. No 
Intent).  Participants first read a short hypothetical story, containing the manipulations, and 
adapted from Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla’s (2007) materials in which the main character, a 
scientist, technically violated the bodily norm of cannibalism by creating an artificial steak 
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made out of cloned human cells. Eight different versions of this story orthogonally varied the 
three characteristics of taboo, harm and intent (see Appendix A for manipulations).   
Individuals then responded to several measures of disgust and anger reactions (same 
measures as Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). These emotions were examined using both 
words and endorsement of facial expressions because past research has shown that anger and 
disgust terms in English are often used as synonyms (Russell & Fehr, 1994; Johnson & Laird-
Oatley, 1989; Nabi, 2002). The face items were black-and-white photos taken from Rozin et 
al. (1999). Emotion terms for anger, were angry, infuriated, outraged, and for disgust, 
disgusted, repulsed, sickened, grossed-out. These items were assessed on a 9-point scale that 
ranged from 1 not at all to 9 very, and were interspersed among a number of filler positive 
and negative emotion terms that were not of theoretical interest.  
Individuals then responded to specific measures of appraisals of the scientist’s actions 
and gave their overall moral judgment of the actions as “right” or “wrong” (see Appendix B 
for measures). All of these measures were examined using a 9-point scale that ranged from 1, 
very strongly disagree to 9, very strongly agree. Two items assessed the evaluation of harm 
to others. Three items assessed intentionality.  As appraisals related to the manipulation of 
taboo violation, we included items based on a number of existing theories of moral disgust, 
labeled the abnormality appraisal.  These items included concepts of abnormality and 
impurity (Rozin et al., 1999) as well as inferences of character flaws (Rozin et al., 1993; 
Miller, 1997). An item was also included to assess whether participants thought the behavior 
was wrong.  
Results 
Data Preparation  
The anger word items (angry, infuriated, outraged), were a reliable scale, Cronbach 
α= .91; as were the four disgust word items (disgusted, repulsed, sickened, grossed-out), 
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Cronbach α = .93. Although the negative emotion measures were significantly 
intercorrelated, the face measurements had their strongest correlations with the corresponding 
emotion word scales. Anger face endorsement correlated more strongly with the anger word 
scale, r(241) = .68, p<.01, than with the disgust word scale,  r(241) = .51, p<.01, and the 
difference between dependent correlations was significant, t(238) = 4.75, p<.001. Disgust 
face endorsement was more strongly correlated with the disgust word scale, r(241) = .54, 
p<.01 than with anger words, r(241) =.35 , p<.01 and the difference between dependent 
correlations was significant, t(238) = 4.65, p<.001. As in Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007), 
the facial endorsement and the word mean were both standardized, and then averaged 
together, to create two general measures of anger and disgust. The three appraisal variables 
were found to be reliable measures: harm appraisal,  r(241) =.81 , p<.01; intent appraisal, 
Cronbach α=.78; abnormality appraisal, Cronbach α=.87. Also, in a principal components 
factor analysis with varimax rotation, each set of appraisal items loaded on its own factor at 
.72 or higher, with no cross-loadings over .31.   
Moral Judgment 
We were concerned that statistically separating the disgust emotion from anger might 
result in a form of disgust that had nothing to with moral judgment of the acts as right and 
wrong. However, across the conditions it was found that both anger (β =.45, p<.001) and 
disgust (β =.33, p<.001) uniquely predicted moral judgment. The three appraisals also each 
uniquely predicted moral judgment, abnormality (β =.23, p<.001), harm (β =.51, p<.001) and 
intent (β =.21, p<.001). Therefore, both disgust and anger in this context were morally 
relevant emotions, even controlling for each other, and each of the measured appraisals also 
contributed to moral judgment in some way.  
Emotions 
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As in other research on these moral emotions, our composite measures of anger and 
disgust were correlated overall, r(241) = .62, p < .01. Two general linear model based 
ANOVAs testing the experimental design were carried out on each emotion, entering the 
experimental factors as fixed effects in a 2 x 2 x 2 design, but not controlling for the two 
emotions’ co-activation (Table 1). When anger was the DV, we found main effects for intent, 
harm and taboo, as well as a significant interaction between intent and taboo. When disgust 
was the DV, there were significant main effects for taboo and intent, also, the interaction 
between harm and taboo was found to be marginally significant. No other effects were found 
to be significant for either emotion, all p >.20.  
However, the main purpose of this research was to disentangle anger and disgust’s 
unique effects, despite their frequent co-activation in moral judgments. We then repeated the 
previous analyses entering the other emotion as a covariate.  For anger as the DV controlling 
for disgust, we found main effects for intent and harm (Table 1). No other main effects or 
interactions of the manipulations were significant, all p >. 10. When this analysis was 
repeated using disgust as the DV controlling for anger, there were significant main effects for 
taboo and harm (Table 1).  Although the effect of harm was unexpected, looking at the 
means, harm actually reduced disgust reactions, whereas it had increased anger. The main 
effect of intent was not significant and no interactions were significant, all p >. 12. Therefore, 
taboo was the only factor that had a positive relationship with disgust. 
Appraisals 
To examine the effects of our manipulations on appraisals, three separate ANOVA 
analyses were carried out with each appraisal in turn as the DV (abnormality, harm, intent). 
The three experimental factors again served as fixed effects for each 2 x 2 x 2 analysis. There 
was a significant main effect of taboo for the abnormality appraisal, F(1,233) = 11.69, 
p<.001, partial η2=.05 (Low Taboo: M= 3.06, S.E.=0.15; High Taboo: M=3.80, S.E.=0.15) 
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and a significant main effect of harm for the harm appraisal, F(1,233) = 129.56, p<.001, 
partial η2=.36 (Harm to Self: M= 3.12, S.E.=0.18; Harm to Others: M=6.09, S.E.=0.19); no 
other effects on these appraisals were significant. The strongest main effect of the intent 
manipulation was seen on the intent appraisal, F(1,233) = 238.05, p<.001, partial η2=.51 (No 
Intent: M= 3.25, S.E.=0.15; Intent: M=6.46, S.E.=0.15), but the intent manipulation also had 
secondary effects on the harm appraisal, F(1,233) = 19.45, p<.001, partial η2=.08 (No Intent: 
M= 4.02, S.E.= 0.18; Intent: M= 5.17, S.E.=0.18) and abnormality appraisal, F(1,233) = 
39.24, p<.001, partial η2=.14 (No Intent: M= 2.76, S.E.=0.15; Intent: M= 4.11, S.E.=0.15). 
An unexpected interaction was also found between intent and taboo for the abnormality 
appraisal (A):  F(1,233) = 7.62, p<.01, partial η2=.03, and for the intent appraisal (I): 
F(1,233) = 6.94, p<.01, partial η2=.03, on inspection of the means it appeared as if the 
combination of intent and taboo intensified both judgments (No Intent/Low Taboo: A=2.69, 
I=3.64 ; No Intent/High Taboo: A=2.83, I=2.86; Intent/Low Taboo; A=3.44, I=6.31; No 
Intent/ High Taboo: A=4.77, I=6.62). Overall, however, each manipulation primarily 
influenced its corresponding appraisal variable. 
 As an internal analysis, two multiple regression analyses, one for each of the emotion 
variables, were conducted for the whole data set across conditions, using the appraisals  of 
abnormality, harm, and intent as predictors.  First, we carried out the analyses not controlling 
for the two emotions’ co-activation (Table 2). When anger was the DV, all of the appraisals 
were significant predictors. However, when disgust was the DV, the harm and abnormality 
appraisals were the only significant predictors. We then repeated the analyses controlling for 
the two emotions co-activation, by entering the other emotion as a predictor, so that scores 
for anger excluded the influence of disgust and vice versa (Table 2). For anger as the DV 
controlling for disgust, intent and particularly harm most reliably predicted anger; 
abnormality was a secondary, marginally significant predictor. When this analysis was 
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repeated on disgust controlling for anger, the abnormality appraisal was the only significant 
predictor, and the other two variables were not significant.  
To see whether appraisals could account for the effects of our manipulations on each 
emotion, mediation analyses were carried out, controlling again for the other emotion in each 
analysis where an emotion was a DV (Figure 1). The harm appraisal fully accounted for the 
relationship between the harm manipulation and anger, while the abnormality appraisal was a 
partial mediator between the taboo manipulation and disgust. Because all three appraisals 
(abnormality, harm, intent) were affected by the intent manipulation in our data, we ran three 
regression analyses examining each appraisal as a possible mediator, controlling for the other 
two appraisals. When controlling for the other two appraisals, the abnormality appraisal (β = 
.07, p=.39) and the harm appraisal (β = .02, p=.79) were no longer related to the intent 
manipulation; therefore, these appraisals were no longer potential mediators for this 
relationship. However, the intent appraisal was related to the intent manipulation when 
controlling for the other appraisals, and this appraisal fully accounted for the relationship 
between the intent manipulation and anger.  
Discussion 
The following results support our hypothesis that anger but not disgust responds to the 
contextual cues of harm and intent. Importantly, we found that anger and disgust, as well as 
their related appraisals, each contributed unique variance to moral judgments Focusing on our 
analyses that separated the effects of the two emotions through covariates, as in Gutierrez and 
Giner-Sorolla (2007), we found that disgust specifically responds to whether or not a bodily 
violation has occurred, while anger and not disgust responds to harm. However, in extension 
to this, we also found that anger was influenced by both our manipulation and our measured 
variable of intentionality.  Although intent at first appeared to influence disgust, controlling 
for anger completely eliminated the influence of the intentionality manipulation on disgust, 
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while the taboo manipulation remained influential.  Therefore, while an actor’s intentionality 
may appear to increase moral disgust, we found that this was entirely due to the concurrent 
activation of anger in moral situations.  
When examining how our measured appraisals related to these moral emotions, we 
also found that appraisals of harm and intentionality predicted anger. The abnormality 
appraisal was also slightly related to anger; however, this was expected based on prior 
findings, in that anger and presumptions of harm often arise in response to bodily norm 
violations, but to a lesser extent than disgust responses (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). 
Moreover, the appraisals of harm and intentionality fully accounted for the effects of their 
respective manipulations on anger, while abnormality did not similarly explain the effect of 
the intent manipulation on anger.  
In comparison, our abnormality appraisal variable was correlated with disgust overall 
and was the only appraisal that was related to our taboo manipulation.  At the same time, 
this appraisal variable could not fully account for the effect of our taboo manipulation on 
disgust. Our measure of abnormality incorporated a number of items, with good internal 
reliability, that accounted for many of the existing theoretical appraisals that would cause 
moral disgust toward a bodily violation: purity concerns, abnormality, and negative 
judgments of the character of the violator.  Therefore, although it is always possible that 
these items missed out a crucial appraisal, it is difficult to see what that appraisal might be. 
In fact, this measure in its breadth may have also tapped some concerns that are not unique 
to moral disgust. For example, our intent manipulation unexpectedly affected abnormality 
judgments across conditions, possibly because intentionally doing harmful (and not just 
disgusting) things is also out of the ordinary and reflects badly on a person’s character.  
Importantly, though, abnormality did not affect anger when controlling for disgust and 
appraisals of intent and harm, while it did affect disgust when controlling for anger and 
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those appraisals. So, the effect of abnormality on disgust, unlike anger, did not primarily 
depend on the judgment that intentional, harmful actions are also abnormal and show bad 
character. It may be that that disgust, as opposed to anger, is elicited by the mere perception 
of a taboo violation such as cannibalism. In that case, more abstract appraisals such as 
impurity and abnormality may not completely account for the response, or may in fact be 
post-hoc justifications of it.   
Moreover, in legal philosophy, these findings provide empirical support for 
arguments that disgust is a less allowable emotion under liberal concepts of the law than 
anger (Nussbaum, 2004). Determining intent is a key concept of liberal jurisprudence; the 
fact that disgust is not responsive to intent shows it to be a less reasonable emotion than 
anger, which responds to more legitimate concerns of harm and justice. Not only does 
disgust encourage avoidance rather than anger’s more productive action of reprimand, but 
disgust’s obliviousness to important elements of legal judgment means that it is more likely 
to be an illegitimate influence on court proceedings.  While anger as a motive for 
punishment can itself be biased, its responsiveness to matters of harm and intent, as we have 
shown here, makes it a more legitimate motivation of justice concerns.  The insight of 
Aeschylus still applies today; in liberal concepts of the law, breaking a taboo is not a crime, 
unless it is done with the intent to harm. 
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Table 1 
Emotions: All main effects and significant interactions 
Anger not controlling for disgust 
 F η
2
   
Intent 24.55 *** .10 No Intent                -0.25 (0.08) Intent                        0.29 (0.08) 
Harm 18.83*** .08 Harm to self            -0.21 (0.08) Harm to others         0.26 (0.08) 
Taboo 5.31* .02 Low Taboo             -0.10 (0.08) High Taboo              0.15 (0.08) 
    
No Intent 
Low Taboo 
 
No Intent 
High Taboo 
 
Intent          
Low Taboo 
 
Intent         
High Taboo 
Intent x taboo 4.72* .02 -0.25 (0.11) -0.24 (0.11) 0.05 (0.11) 0.53 (0.11) 
Anger controlling for disgust 
Intent 10.54*** .04 No Intent                -0.12 (0.06)          Intent                        0.17 (0.06)                       
Harm 29.72*** .11 Harm to self            -0.21 (0.06)         Harm to others         0.26 (0.06)        
Taboo 0.08 .00 Low Taboo              0.03 (0.06)       High Taboo              0.01 (0.06)     
Disgust not controlling for anger 
Intent  14.29*** .06 No Intent                -0.20 (0.08)  Intent                        0.20 (0.08) 
Harm 0.001 .00 Harm to self            0.00  (0.08) Harm to others        -0.00 (0.08) 
Taboo 17.56*** .07 Low Taboo             -0.22 (0.08) High Taboo              0.22 (0.08) 
    
Harm to self 
Low Taboo 
 
Harm to self 
High Taboo 
 
Harm to other         
Low Taboo 
 
Harm to other        
High Taboo 
Harm x Taboo 3.41 † .01 -0.12 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11) -0.32 (0.11) 0.32 (0.11) 
Disgust controlling for anger 
Intent  0.88 .00 No Intent                -0.05 (0.06)         Intent                        0.04 (0.06)          
Harm 10.15** .04 Harm to self             0.14 (0.06)       Harm to others        -0.14 (0.06)          
Taboo 12.01*** .05 Low Taboo             -0.15 (0.06)       High Taboo              0.15 (0.06)         
 
Note:  ***, p≤.001; **, p≤.01; *, p<.05, †, p<.10.  Means are reported and standard errors are in parentheses.  
Not controlling for other emotion, df= 1,233; controlling for other emotion, df= 1,232 
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Table 2 
Regression Analyses 
 
Anger not controlling for disgust 
β Zero-Order 
Correlation 
Partial 
Correlation 
Harm Appraisal .51*** .64 .54 
Abnormality Appraisal .24*** .50 .27 
Intent Appraisal .14** .38 .17 
 
Anger controlling for disgust 
 
Harm Appraisal .42*** .64 .50 
Abnormality Appraisal .10 † .50 .12 
Intent Appraisal .12** .38 .16 
 
Disgust not controlling for anger 
 
Harm Appraisal .24*** .41 .25 
Abnormality Appraisal .38*** .50 .36 
Intent Appraisal .06 .30 .06 
 
Disgust controlling for anger 
 
Harm Appraisal -.02 .41 -.02 
Abnormality Appraisal .26*** .50 .27 
Intent Appraisal -.01 .30 -.01 
 
Note:  ***, p≤.001; **, p≤.01; *, p<.05, †, p<.10.   
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Figure 1: Analyses of Appraisals as Mediators in Manipulation-Emotion Effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
Harm Appraisal 
z =6.51*** 
Abnormality Appraisal 
z = 2.57* 
Intent Appraisal  
z = 1.98* 
 
Intent Anger 
Taboo Disgust Anger Harm 
 . 61*** 
 
.23*** .47*** 
 
 .58*** 
 
.20** 
 
Zero- Order= .26*** 
 
-.02 ns 
 
.14** 
 
.12 * 
 
-.01  ns 
 
Zero-Order= .15 ** 
 
Note:  ***, p<.001; **, p<.01; *, p<.05.  Mediation analysis for the intent appraisal’s effects was conducted controlling for 
the effects of the other appraisals, which were influenced to a lesser extent by the intent manipulation. 
Zero-Order=.17*** 
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Appendix A 
 
Manipulations 
 
High Taboo, Harm to Others, No Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in 
biotechnology has recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks her research assistant to 
send her a number of cow muscle cells from the old lab, so she can clone them on a dish.  
However, the research assistant makes a mistake in labelling the vials, and sends her some 
cells from the scientist’s own arm, that had been used in some unrelated research and proven 
to be free of disease.  The cells grow into a strip of human muscle tissue about the size of a 
steak, but the scientist doesn’t know it’s her own flesh. A few days later the scientist is 
curious about the taste of the human steak that she thinks is beef, so she goes into the freezer 
and takes out the piece of meat. She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it at a dinner party 
to one of her guests, telling him its lab-grown beef.  Eventually, the mistake comes to light, 
and the dinner guest discovers what the meat really was and becomes really upset at being 
fooled like that.  The scientist never repeats the experiment. 
 
High Taboo, Harm to Self, No Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in biotechnology 
has recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks her research assistant to send her a 
number of cow muscle cells from the old lab, so she can clone them on a dish.  However, the 
research assistant makes a mistake in labelling the vials, and sends her some cells from the 
scientist’s own arm, that had been used in some unrelated research and proven to be free of 
disease.  The cells grow into a strip of human muscle tissue about the size of a steak, but the 
scientist doesn’t know it’s her own flesh. A few days later the scientist is curious about the 
taste of the human steak that she thinks is beef, so she goes into the freezer and takes out the 
piece of meat. She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it to herself for dinner.  The 
mistake never comes to light, and the scientist never discovers what the meat really was.  
Although the experience does not upset her, she does not develop a taste for human flesh and 
never repeats the experiment. 
 
High Taboo, Harm to Others, Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in biotechnology 
has recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks the research assistant to send some 
cells from the scientist’s own arm, cells that had been used in some unrelated research and 
proven to be free of disease.  The scientist then decides to clone her own cells into a strip of 
human muscle tissue about the size of a steak, knowing that it’s her own flesh. A few days 
later the scientist is curious about the taste of the human steak, so she goes into the freezer 
and takes out the piece of meat. She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it at a dinner party 
to one of her guests, telling him its lab-grown beef.  Eventually, the dinner guest discovers 
what the meat really was and becomes really upset at being fooled like that. The scientist 
never repeats the experiment. 
 
High Taboo, Harm to Self, Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in biotechnology has 
recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks the research assistant to send some cells 
from the scientist’s own arm, cells that had been used in some unrelated research and proven 
to be free of disease.  The scientist then decides to clone her own cells into a strip of human 
muscle tissue about the size of a steak, knowing that it’s her own flesh. A few days later the 
scientist is curious about the taste of the human steak, so she goes into the freezer and takes 
out the piece of meat.  She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it to herself for dinner.  
Although the experience does not upset her, she does not develop a taste for human flesh and 
never repeats the experiment. 
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Low Taboo, Harm to Others, No Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in 
biotechnology has recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks her research assistant to 
send her a number of cow muscle cells from the old lab, so she can clone them on a dish.  
However, the research assistant makes a mistake in labelling the vials, and sends her some 
cells from the muscle tissue of a sheep, that had been used in some unrelated research and 
proven to be free of disease.  The cells grow into a strip of sheep muscle tissue about the size 
of a steak, but the scientist doesn’t know its sheep flesh. A few days later the scientist is 
curious about the taste of the sheep steak that she thinks is beef, so she goes into the freezer 
and takes out the piece of meat. She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it at a dinner party 
to one of her guests, telling him its lab-grown beef.  Eventually, the mistake comes to light, 
and the dinner guest discovers what the meat really was and becomes really upset at being 
fooled like that.   The scientist never repeats the experiment. 
 
Low Taboo, Harm to Self, No Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in biotechnology 
has recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks her research assistant to send her a 
number of cow muscle cells from the old lab, so she can clone them on a dish.  However, the 
research assistant makes a mistake in labelling the vials, and sends her some cells from the 
muscle tissue of a sheep, that had been used in some unrelated research and proven to be free 
of disease.  The cells grow into a strip of sheep muscle tissue about the size of a steak, but the 
scientist doesn’t know its sheep flesh. A few days later the scientist is curious about the taste 
of the sheep steak that she thinks is beef, so she goes into the freezer and takes out the piece 
of meat. She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it to herself for dinner.  The mistake 
never comes to light, and the scientist never discovers what the meat really was.  Although 
the experience does not upset her; she does not develop a taste for sheep flesh and never 
repeats the experiment. 
 
Low Taboo, Harm to Others, Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in biotechnology 
has recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks the research assistant to send some 
muscle cells from a sheep, cells that had been used in some unrelated research and proven to 
be free of disease.  The scientist then decides to clone the sheep cells into a strip of sheep 
muscle tissue about the size of a steak, knowing that it is sheep. A few days later the scientist 
is curious about the taste of the sheep steak, so she goes into the freezer and takes out the 
piece of meat. She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it at a dinner party to one of her 
guests, telling him its lab-grown beef.  Eventually, the dinner guest discovers what the meat 
really was and becomes really upset at being fooled like that. The scientist never repeats the 
experiment. 
 
Low Taboo, Harm to Self, Intent: A scientist studying recent advances in biotechnology has 
recently moved from one lab to another.  She asks the research assistant to send some muscle 
cells from a sheep, cells that had been used in some unrelated research and proven to be free 
of disease.  The scientist then decides to clone the sheep cells into a strip of sheep muscle 
tissue about the size of a steak, knowing that it is sheep. A few days later the scientist is 
curious about the taste of the sheep steak, so she goes into the freezer and takes out the piece 
of meat.  She then grills it on a barbecue, and serves it to herself for dinner.  Although the 
experience does not upset her, she does not develop a taste for sheep flesh and never repeats 
the experiment. 
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Appendix B 
 
Appraisal and Moral Judgement Measures 
 
Harm Appraisal 
- The scientist harmed other people 
- The scientist violated the rights of other people 
 
Intent Appraisal 
- What the scientist did was intentional  
- The scientist was not aware of any harm that might be caused to other people (reverse 
scored) 
- The scientist meant to do what she did.  
 
Abnormality Appraisal 
- The scientist is abnormal because of what she has done.  
- The scientist is a lesser human being because of what she has done.  
- The scientist has become impure because of what she has done.  
- The scientist appears to be mentally unstable.  
 
Moral Judgement 
- What the scientist did was wrong 
 
Other 
- The scientist harmed herself 
- What the scientist did was justified 
- What the scientist did was fair 
- What the scientist did was bad 
- The scientist should be held accountable for her actions 
- The scientist was not aware of any harm that might be caused to herself (reverse 
scored) 
